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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
vs. 
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, APPEAL No. 920226 
Defendant, Appellee, 
and, 
RICK WARNER LINCOLN-MERCURY, Category 16 
Defendant, Appellee. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appellant, Guy Barco Zewadski, (hereinafter 
"Zewadski"), appearing pro-se, hereby submits this brief. 
JURISDICTION 
X. The Supreme Court of Utah has appellate jurisdict ion 
over orders, judgments and decrees of any court of record over 
which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdict ion. This jurisdict ion is conferred pursuant to the 
Constitution of Utah, Art. VIII, Sec. 3, and U.C.A. 78-2-
2(3)(j); said Court referred the matter to the Court of Appeals 
and its jurisdict ion is based upon U.C.A.78-2a-3(h^: and Rules 3, 
4, and 42, of the U.R.A.P.. 
2* This is an appeal from a final summary judgment in a contract 
dispute in favor of Ford Motor Credit Company's counterclaim, entered by the 
l 
Honorable Pat B. Brian of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and orders entered prior to final disposition, granting a 
summary judgment dismissing Zewadski's complaint, and attorneys' fees. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether trial court erred in finding all warranties as to 
merchantabiUty or fitness for purpose were excluded by a disclaimer clause in 
the lease contract, permitting summary judgment, or if such disclaimer clauses 
are without effect in consumer transactions for new consumer products which 
have express warranties or service contracts, as a matter of law? Question of 
law reviewed for correctness. 
2* Whether the admissible evidence before the trial court below is 
sufficient to support the granting of the summary judgment order, and its 
findings, dismissing Zewadski's First Amended Complaint? Question of law 
reviewed for correctness. 
3* Whether summary judgment in favor of Ford Motor Credit 
Company's ("Ford Credit") counterclaim was available as a matter of law? 
Question of law reviewed for correctness. 
4. Whether the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act serves to protect 
Zewadski from unconscionable or deceptive practices by Rick Warner 
Lincoln-Mercury ("Rick Warner") and Ford Credit in this case? This is a 
question of law reviewed for correctness. 
2 
5* Whether the granting of attorneys fees to Ford Credit was 
supported by law in view of the issues presented hereinbefore 
absent showing that the all terms of the contract for such 
recovery had been met; and whether Ford Credit failed to 
apportion the fees to reflect only expenses incurred in the 
counterclaim contrary to an order of the trial court to so 
apportion? This is a question of law reviewed for correctness. 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
1. U.R.C.P. Rule 56(c), (Summary Judgment): 
"(c) Motion and Proceedings thereon. The motion 
shall be served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the 
hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve 
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers, to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone 
although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of damages." 
2. U.R.C.P. Rule 15(b), (Amended and supplemental pleadings): 
"(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not 
raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, 
they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 
Such amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to 
conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of 
any party at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not 
affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the 
trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the 
court may allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the 
merits of the action will be sub served thereby and the objecting party fails to 
satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in 
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a 
3 
continuance , if necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet 
such evidence. 
3* "U.C.S.P.A.": U.C.A. 13-11-1 through 22, amended: 
U.C.A. 13-11-2: Construction and purposes of act. 
"This act shall be construed liberally to promote the 
following policies: 
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law 
governing consumer sales practices; 
(2) to protect consumers from suppliers who commit 
deceptive and unconscionable sales practices; 
(4) to make state regulation of consumer sales 
practices not inconsistent with the policies of the 
Federal Trade Commission Act relating to consumer 
protection;" 
U.C.A. 13-11-3: Definitions: 
(2) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease, 
assignment, award by chance, or other written or oral 
transfer or disposition of goods, services, or other 
property both tangible and intangible (except 
securities and insurance) to a person for primarily 
personal, family, or household purposes, or for 
purposes that relate to a business opportunity that 
requires both his expenditure of money or property and 
his personal services on a continuing basis and in 
which he has not been previously engaged, or a 
solicitation or offer by a supplier with respect to any 
of these transfers or dispositions. It includes any 
offer or solicitation, any agreement, and any 
performance of an agreement with respect to any of 
these transfers or dispositions. " 
(5) "Person" means an individual, corporation, 
government, governmental 
subdivision or agency, business trust, estate trust, 
partnership, association, cooperative, or any other 
legal entity." 
(6) "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, 
offeror, broker, or other person who regularly solicits, 
engages in, or enforces consumer transactions, whether 
or not he deals directly with the consumer." 
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U.C.A. 13-11-5(1)(2)(3): (Unconscionable act or practice): 
"(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier 
in connection with a consumer transaction violates this 
act whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction. 
(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a 
question of law for the court. If it is claimed or 
appears to the court that an act or practice may be 
unconscionable, the parties shall be given a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence as to its setting, 
purpose, and effect to aid the court in making its 
determination. 
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is 
unconscionable, the court shall consider circumstances 
which the supplier knew or had reason to know." 
U.C.A. 13-11-4 ( l )(2)(2j): Deceptive act or practice: 
"(1) A deceptive act or practice by a supplier in 
connection with a consumer transaction violates this 
chapter whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction. 
(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), a 
supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if the 
supplier, with intent to deceive. 
(2)(j) indicates that a consumer transaction involves 
or does not involve a warranty, a disclaimer of 
warranties, particular warranty terms, or other rights, 
remedies, or obligations if the indication is false." 
U.C.A. 13-11-19. Action by consumer: 
"(2) A consumer who suffers loss as a result of a 
violation of this chapter may recover, but not in a 
class action, actual damages or $2,000.00, whichever 
is greater, plus court costs." 
4. Magnuson-Moss- Warranty- Federal Trade Commission 
Improvement Act, 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2301(1)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8): 
"(1) The term "consumer product" means any tangible 
personal property which is distributed in commerce 
and which is normally used for personal, family, or 
household purposes (including any such property 
intended to be attached to or installed in any real 
property without regard to whether it is so attached or 
5 
installed). 
(3) The term "consumer" means a buyer (other than 
for purposes of resale) of any consumer product, any 
person to whom such product is transferred during the 
duration of an implied or written warranty (or service 
contract) applicable to the product, and any other 
person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty 
(or service contract) or under applicable State law to 
enforce against the warrantor (or service contractor) 
the obligations of the warranty (or service contract). 
(4) The term "supplier" means any person engaged in 
the business of making a consumer product directly or 
indirectly available to consumers. " 
(5) The term "warrantor" means any supplier or 
other person who gives or offers to give a written 
warranty or who is or may be obligated under an 
implied warranty." 
(6) The term "written warranty" means — 
(A) any written affirmation of fact or written 
promise made in connection with the sale of 
a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer 
which relates to the nature of the material or 
workmanship and affirms or promises that 
such material or workmanship is defect free 
or will meet a specified level of performance 
over a specified period of time, or 
(B) any undertaking in writing in connection 
with the sale by a supplier of a consumer 
product to refund, repair, replace, or take 
other remedial action with respect to such 
product in the event that such product fails 
to meet the specifications set forth in the 
undertaking, which written affirmation, 
promise, or undertaking becomes part of the 
basis of the bargain between a supplier and a 
buyer for purposes other than resale of such 
product. 
(7) The term "implied warranty" means an implied 
warranty arising under State law (as modified by 
sections 108 and 104(a) in connection with the sale by 
a supplier of a consumer product. 
(8) term "service contract" means a contract in 
writing to perform, over a fixed period of time or for a 
specified duration, services relating to the 
6 
maintenance or repair (or both) of a consumer 
product." 
15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2308: Implied Warranties, restrictions on 
disclaimers. . . 
"(a) No supplier may disclaim or modify... any 
implied warranty to a consumer with respect to such 
consumer product if (1) such supplier makes any 
written warranty to the consumer with respect to such 
consumer product, or (2) at the time of sale, or within 
90 days thereafter, such supplier enters into a service 
contract with the consumer which applies to such 
consumer product. 
(c) A disclaimer, modification, or limitation made in 
violation of this section shall be ineffective for 
purposes of this chapter and State law. " 
NATURE AND DISPOSITION OF CASE. 
±. This is an action brought in a contract dispute 
wherein appellant Zewadski brought action, with a verified 
complaint, against respondents Ford Credit and Rick Warner for 
rescission of contract and damages regarding a lease of a new 
automobile for personal use, alleging fraud and 
misrepresentation, and Ford Credit brought a counterclaim to 
enforce the contract. Zewadski answered setting forth 
affirmative defenses of estoppel and fraud, and denials. 
2. After hearings on briefed arguments, wherein Ford 
Credit submitted no affidavits or impeaching evidence, Ford 
Credit was granted a summary judgment dismissing Zewadski 's 
complaint. 
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i Ford Credit moved for summary judgment on their 
counterclaim with no supporting affidavits, and the court 
granted that motion finding Zewadski in default of the contract. 
Zewadski filed several affidavits and verified pleadings 
opposing summary judgment. 
4. Several interim motions of Zewadski to amend the 
pleadings and vacate interlocutory summary judgment on 
Zewadski's complaint were heard and denied on basis that the 
issues sought to supplement had already been heard and decided. 
£. Judge Pat B. Brian entered Final Judgment on 
September 20, 1991, reaffirmed by an Order entered December 
30, 1991. 
<L The trial court granted Zewadski's motion that Ford 
Credit's attorneys' fees affidavit apportion the fees to claim 
recovery only for fees directly incurred in the counterclaim, and 
ordered Ford Credit to file a supplemental attorneys' fees 
affidavit and amended order. 
.2* Zewadski filed a notice of Appeal January 29, 1992, 
and was assigned number 920054 with the Supreme Court. 
IL This matter was thereafter referred to the Court of 
Appeals of the State of Utah, and is now presently pending 
8 
before this body in the instant case as number 920226-CA. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
1. This case was instituted by Zewadski to rescind a 
contract, recover deposits and damages, for fraud by Zewadski's 
filing a verified complaint (TR-2 -7), and verified amended 
complaint (TR-9-19) on April 4, 1989. The suit was brought by 
Zewadski against both Rick Warner, and Ford Credit (TR-2, 
TR-9), and both answered (TR-22-31; TR-110-114). 
2u The lease contract was negotiated between Zewadski 
and Rick Warner, and was assigned to Ford Credit upon its 
signing, pursuant to terms of the contract (TR-303, TR-17-18, 
TR-26, TR-550, TR-553-554). 
3. The contract was for the lease of a new passenger 
automobile, for personal use (TR-17; TR-553-554; TR-549-550), 
which, as part of the bargain, expressly included a service 
contract, incorporated by reference upon the face of the lease 
instrument (TR-17-18; TR-305, TR-550-554, 554a, 554b). 
4a The suit was instituted after Zewadski discovered the 
misrepresentations of the automobile and lease, and sought cure, 
was offered no cure by Rick Warner or Ford Credit, who denied 
warranty responsibilities and would not agree to rescind the 
9 
contract (TR-4, TR-10-11, TR-182-183, TR-270). 
iL Zewadski gave written notice of rescission of the 
contract and returned the automobile promptly upon realization 
that Rick Warner and/or Ford Credit denied existence of 
warranty responsibilities.( TR-167-183, 182; TR-351, TR-270, 
TR-4, TR-11, TR-348-353). 
(L Zewadski verified his Complaint (TR-7), and First 
Amended Complaint (TR-16), setting forth facts under oath. 
T. Ford Credit answered to Zewadski's complaint and 
counterclaimed to enforce the terms of the lease, alleging 
default for failure to make payments, (TR-22-27), to which 
Zewadski answered, (TR-48-55). 
fL Summary judgments issued on both the complaint, 
(TR-228-230); and on the counterclaim(TR-573-575). 
JL Zewadski was deposed by both Rick Warner and Ford 
Credit on the 14th day of September, 1989, however said 
deposition was not filed with the trial court and is not part of 
the record on appeal. 
10. Summary Judgment was granted dismissing Zewadski's 
complaint upon the courts finding: "that all warranties, if any, 
as to merchantability or fitness for purpose were excluded" , 
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"that there is no credible showing that the vehicle failed to 
perform within acceptable standards", "that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact", and "that Ford Motor Credit 
Company is entitled to Judgment as a matter of law" (TR-228-
230). 
11. A second Summary Judgment was granted in favor of 
Ford Credit's counterclaim upon the court finding: "there is no 
remaining issue as to any material fact in this case, including 
but not limited to, such issues regarding service contracts or 
warranties", "that all events have occurred which entitle FMCC 
to recover a judgment from Plaintiff pursuant to the terms of the 
Lease", and "that FMCC is entitled to judgment on its 
Counterclaim against Plaintiff as a matter of law" (TR-573-575). 
12. During the time between the summary judgment on 
Zewadski's complaint, and the final summary judgment upon 
Ford Credit's counterclaim, Zewadski submitted several 
motions with affidavits, which were heard, and for which orders 
and findings were entered, attempting to get leave of the court 
to supplement or amend his complaint and first amended 
complaint (TR-376-376a; TR-383-392; TR-367-370); and his 
answer to Ford Credits counterclaim (TR-283-293, TR-268-278, 
TR-296-300), vacate an order (TR-355-366, TR-367-372), all 
l l 
based upon affidavits and memorandums, and verified proposed 
supplemental pleadings (TR-377-382) (TR-337-343) showing 
that the contract which Ford Credit sought enforcement of was 
unenforceable due to a fraud upon its face, and/ or, was 
unconscionable (TR- 268-278, TR-296-300, TR-283-292), TR-
376-376a, TR-383-392, TR-367-370, TR-355-366, TR-367-372). 
Ford Credit offered no supporting affidavits or evidence 
opposing these motions. The court denied Zewadski's motion to 
vacate the first summary judgment of January 2, 1991 (TR-501), 
and his motion to supplement his complaint and first amended 
complaint (TR-500-501), finding that Zewadski offered no new 
factual or legal argument beyond what had been briefed prior to 
the first summary judgment (TR-500), apparently referring to 
Zewadski's affidavit and supplemental pleadings opposing 
summary judgment on complaint (TR-167-196 ). 
13» The court denied Zewadski's motion to supplement his answer to 
Ford Credit's counterclaim, after reviewing the proposed answer (TR-500-
501)(TR-337-343), and hearing extensive argument (TR-580-581), finding 
that his amended answer to counterclaim was based upon and raised factual 
and legal issues regarding a service contract and warranties, upon which the 
court had held do not exist or are not relevant in the case (TR-580-581). 
14. Ford Credit submitted an attorneys fee affidavit, (TR-
12 
418-427); a supplemental attorneys fee affidavit, (TR-565-575); 
and last, after a court order, another supplemental attorneys' 
fee affidavit (TR-504-538). 
15. After the final Summary Judgment was entered, 
including an award of attorneys fees (TR-573-575), Zewadski 
moved the court to strike the attorneys' fee affidavits (TR-586-
589, 590-593) questioning the legal basis of the award, in 
which proper apportionment of fees was brought in issue (TR-
638-640). A hearing was had on the attorneys' fees issues (TR-
721-726 ), and the trial court granted Zewadski's motion and 
ordered Ford Credit to file a supplemental attorneys' fee 
affidavit that properly apportioned the attorneys' fees to show 
those due under the contract, and law, and further comply with 
Utah law (TR-722-723) (TR-679-680), and to file an amended 
order reflecting correct fees (TR-724, lines 16-22). 
16. Zewadski moved for a new trial (TR-594-595, TR-597-
604, 605-607) which was decided against Zewadski, embodied in 
a "Supplemental Order" (TR-679-680). 
17. The trial court record doesn't contain transcripts for 
(1) the hearing on the motion for summary judgment on the first 
amended complaint(TR-228-230) and; (2) the hearing on 
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Zewadski's motions to (a) supplement the complaint, (b) vacate 
the summary judgment on the complaint, (c) supplement 
Zewadski's answer to Ford Credits counterclaim; and Ford 
Credit's motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim, 
(TR-498-501), (TR-570-582, TR-573-575). 
17. The Trial Court found that the instant lease was a true 
lease (TR-574). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1* SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE 
UNLESS THE MOVING PARTY IS ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW AND THERE IS 
NO GENUINE ISSUE OF FACT. 
Summary judgment in this case was an error of law as 
there are genuine issues of material fact. The trial court erred in 
interpreting the law regarding disclaimer clauses in consumer 
transactions. Ford Credit submitted no affidavits, depositions, 
or other evidentiary material to contradict Zewadski's sworn 
facts in verified complaint and affirmative defences of estoppel 
and fraud supported by affidavits and verified pleadings. 
2, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES WERE PROPERLY 
DISCLAIMED 
a.) The trial court apparently relied on Billings 
Yamaha v. Rick Warner Lincoln-Mercurv. 681 P.2d 1276 (Utah 
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1984), concerning a dispute between two merchants, dealers in 
vehicles, wherein the U.C.C. law was applied to validate the 
clause disclaiming implied warranties. 
b.) In a consumer transaction such as this case, 
implied warranties survive disclaimer clauses in contracts if 
there is a service contract. 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2308(a)(c). 
3 . THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT 
AND ERRED IN WEIGHING CREDITABILITY AND 
VERITY OF UN IMPEACHED SWORN TESTIMONY OF 
FACTS 
Neither Rick Warner nor Ford Credit submitted any affidavits or 
evidentiary material to contradict or impeach Zewadski's facts set forth in 
verified pleadings and affidavits. It was an error in law for the trial 
court to weigh the credibility and verity of Zewadski's sworn 
testimony, and to grant summary judgment when genuine issues 
of material fact existed. 
4, THE CONTRACT AT ISSUE IS UNCONSCIONABLE 
AND DECEPTIVE UNDER THE "UTAH CONSUMER 
SALES PRACTICES ACT" WHICH PROHIBITS 
SUPPLIERS FROM PERFORMING UNCONSCIONABLE 
OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES IN CONSUMER 
TRANSACTIONS 
a.) (U.C.A. 13-11-1 through 19) prohibits suppliers 
from performing unconscionable or deceptive acts or practices, 
before during or after the transaction. In this case, the 
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instruments and trial court record shows several violations 
regarding warranty and service contract matters. 
b.) Both Rick Warner and Ford Credit have violated 
the U.C.S.P.A. (1) Rick Warner violated by both putting an 
express clause in the lease contract which disclaimed implied 
warranties when in fact there were implied warranties; and by 
including a service contract which by its express terms was 
invalid, or ineffective without the manufacturer's new vehicle 
warranty which Rick Warner omitted from the contract. XD 
Ford Credit violated by representing to Zewadski and the trial 
court that there were no implied warranties for the vehicle, 
when, in fact there were implied warranties by application of 
law, and by continuing to represent to Zewadski and the trial 
court, after admitting the existence of a service contract, and 
being informed that implied warranties survive disclaimer 




THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED 
COMPLAINT, FINDING THAT ALL WARRANTIES AS 
TO MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR PURPOSE 
WERE EXCLUDED 
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The trial courts granting of summary judgment in 
favor of Ford Credit dismissing Zewadski's first amended 
complaint (TR-228-230) was in error if based upon the legal 
theory that the contract in dispute contained language 
effectively excluding implied warranties as to merchantability or 
fitness for purpose. Summary judgment was granted in favor of 
Ford Credit upon the trial courts finding that, in part, found 
"that all warranties, if any, as to merchantability or fitness for 
purpose were excluded" (TR-229). Utah Courts have held: 
"Even if there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact, a summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings and 
other documents demonstrate that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law." Lockhart Co. v. Anderson. 646 
P.2d 678 (Utah 1982) 
The Utah case law cited by Ford Credit supporting 
their argument that the implied warranties were disclaimed 
wasn't a "consumer" case but was a case of a commercial dispute 
between two dealers in vehicles, familiar with commercial 
practices, applying the law of the U.C.C.. In the instant case 
Zewadski is not a business person but is a "Consumer" as 
defined in the 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2301(3), and leased the 
vehicle for personal use. Transactions, such as the one at issue 
wherein Zewadski was a "consumer" of a "consumer products", 
are protected from such disclaimers by Federal law. The lease 
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contract instrument at issue expressly shows upon its face that 
the lease was for "personal" use, and that part of the bargain 
from the very beginning was a service contract (TR-17, TR-170-
173) ( TR-173, TR-549-554b), and Ford Credit admits under 
oath that a service contract was included in the lease (TR-305). 
The Federal consumer protection laws regarding 
warranties states in part: 
"(a) No supplier may disclaim or modify... any 
implied warranty to a consumer with respect to such consumer 
product if (1) such supplier makes any written warranty to the 
consumer with respect to such consumer product, or (2) at the 
time of sale, or within 90 days thereafter, such supplier enters 
into a service contract with the consumer which applies to such 
consumer product. 
(c) A disclaimer, modification, or limitation made in 
violation of this section shall be ineffective for purposes of this 
chapter and State law. " 
Magnuson-Moss- Warranty- Federal Trade Commission 
Improvement Act. 15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2308 (a)(c). 
Zewadski hasn't found any similar Utah cases 
involving the Federal consumer protection warranty laws, so 
here cites a case from another state: 
..."We next consider whether the complaint states 
causes of action against Maloney for breach of implied 
warranties under the UCC and Magnuson-Moss. The 
issue raised here is the efficacy of the disclaimers 
contained in Maloney's sales contract. 
The UCC permits both the exclusion or limitation of 
an implied warranty of merchantability by conspicuous 
writing which uses the word "merchantability", and 
disclaimer of an implied warranty of fitness for a 
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particular purpose, provided the disclaimer is 
conspicuous.. . Conspicuous writing is defined as so 
written that a reasonable person against whom it is to 
operate ought to have noticed it... 
Maloney's contract expressly provides in three 
separate places that Maloney is disclaiming all 
warranties, express or implied, including any implied 
warranty of merchantability or fitness for a particular 
purpose.. . Such disclaimers effectively avoid liability 
for breach of implied warranty under the UCC.. . 
Maloney's disclaimers under Magnuson-Moss, 
however, must be treated differently. Magnuson-
Moss prohibits a supplier of goods as Maloney, from 
disclaiming implied warranties if: (1) the supplier 
has given a written warranty to the consumer; or 
(2) the supplier has entered a service contract with 
the consumer within 90 days of a sale. (15 U.S.C. 
sec. 2308(a) (1982).)" 
Rothe v. Malonev Cadillac. Inc. . 492 N.E. 2d 497, 503 
(111. App. 1 Dist. 1986)." 
The Utah case cited by Ford Credit (TR-137-138, 140) 
supporting the efficacy of the disclaimer clause in their motion 
for summary judgment, Billings Yamaha v. Rick Warner Ford. 
Inc. . 681 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1984), was a case of a commercial 
dispute between merchants, not a "consumer" case, and was 
decided using law of the Uniform Commercial Code, here cited: 
"Plaintiff, a partnership, purchased a new 1976 
Thunderbird from defendant in July of 1976... 
According to the testimony of Delyle Bill ings, one of 
plaintiff's principles, the car developed problems.. . 
Automobile buyer's remedy for alleged defect in 
automobile was effectively limited to manufacturers 
express warranties by disclaimers in installment sales 
and security agreement and in purchase order, both of 
which expressly excluded warranties of fitness and 
merchantabili ty, and both of which were signed by 
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buyer's principle and his wife... and where buyer, 
which was dealer in motorcycles, was experienced 
with commercial practices... 
Nor is this a case where the buyer was inexperienced 
or unfamiliar with commercial practices. This buyer 
was a dealer in motor vehicles (motorcycles)." 
Billings Yamaha v. Rick Warner Ford. Inc.. 681 P.2d 
1276 (Utah 1984). 
The lease contract's express inclusion of a service 
contract (TR-17, TR-305, TR-171, TR-312, TR-553) preserves 
implied warranties for the automobile regardless of the 
disclaimer clause in the contract by application of 15 U.S.C.A. 
2308(a)(c) ), and the trial court erred in finding that all implied 
warranties were properly disclaimed as a matter of law. This 
argument was properly before the court (TR-185-195) prior to 
the interlocutory summary judgment on complaint. 
POINT 11, 
THE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT 
PRECLUDES AVAILABILITY OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AS THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL 
FACT 
The trial courts granting of summary judgment in 
favor of Ford Credit dismissing Zewadski's first amended 
complaint (TR-228-230) was error if based upon legal theory 
that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact (TR-229), 
and upon findings that, in part, found: 
"that statements of Rick Warner Lincoln-Mercury or 
its employees were not false, fraudulent nor material 
misrepresentations or omissions relating to the capabilities of 
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the vehicle" (TR-229), and; "that there is no credible showing 
that the vehicle failed to perform within acceptable standards" 
(TR-229). 
Summary judgment is available only when no material 
facts are at issue. In the instant case Zewadski provided sworn 
testimony, a "verified" complaint, regarding the 
misrepresentations of Rick Warner and its agents as an 
inducement to enter into the contract , and the failure of the 
vehicle to perform within acceptable standards as represented 
(TR-9-11); to which Ford Credit produced no facts, opposing testimony, 
or impeaching evidence. The trial court erred in weighing credibility and 
verity of Zewadski's sworn testimony, and erred in finding facts contrary to 
those submitted by Zewadski. The Utah courts have held that it is not the 
station of summary judgment to weigh testimony or credibility of witnesses. 
Held: "Court cannot consider the weight of testimony or credibility of 
witness on motion for summary judgment; court simply determines 
that there is no disputed issue of material facts and that as matter of 
law one party should prevail. " Singleton v. Alexander. 431 
P.2d 126 (1967), Sandberg v. Klein. 576 P.2d 1291 
(Utah 1978). 
Held: "Summary judgment is never used to determine what 
the facts are, but only to ascertain whether there are 
any material issues of fact in dispute." Hill ex rel. 
FQgej vt Qrand Cent., Iqp., 477 P.2d 150, 25 Utah 2d 
121, (1970). 
Held: "In ruling on motion for summary judgment, trial court 
must not weigh evidence or assess credibility." 
Mountain States. Etc. v. Atkin. Wright & Miles. 681 
P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984). 
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The Utah courts have held that summary judgment 
should be denied where there are genuine issues of material fact, 
and can consider only facts not in dispute, here cited: 
Held: "In ruling on motion for summary judgment, the court 
may consider only facts that are not in dispute." 
Sorenson v. Beers. 585 P.2d 458 (Utah 1978); 
Held: "This statement was not contradicted or challenged by 
the guarantors and must be accepted as an 
uncontested fact for purposes of summary judgment." 
Landes v. Capital City Bank. 795 P.2d 1121, 1131 
(Utah 1990). 
Held: "A motion for summary judgment should be denied 
where the evidence presents a genuine issue of 
material fact which, if resolved in favor of the non 
moving party, would entitle him to judgment as a 
matter of law." 
"A genuine issue of fact exists where, on the basis of 
the facts in the record, reasonable minds could differ 
on whether defendant's conduct measures up to the 
required standard." Jackson v. Dabney. 645 P.2d 613 
(Utah 1982). 
Zewadski submitted sworn testimony prior to the 
motion for summary judgment, in his verified first amended 
complaint, setting forth sworn facts of causes of action.(TR-10-
11). Utah courts have held that verified pleadings meet the requirement 
of affidavits to defeat a summary judgment, here cited: 
"A plaintiffs verified pleading that meets the requirements for 
affidavits can be considered the equivalent of an affidavit for the 
purpose of defeating a motion for summary judgment. " 
Pentecost v. Harward. 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985). 
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The failure of Ford Credit to object to Zewadski's 
verified first amended complaint, , or to present any affidavits 
contradicting or impeaching the facts set forth by Zewadski 
leaves facts at issue, and the facts are material, setting forth 
fraud and misrepresentation, which would entitle Zewadski to 
relief if resolved in his favor, and so summary judgment is not 
available as a matter of law. Summary judgment is only 
available to the moving party if there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. The pertinent rule U.C.A .Rule 
56(c), is here cited in part: 
"The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if 
the pleadings, depositions, answers, to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 
Though Ford Credit tried to impeach Zewadski's 
testimony by referring in their memorandums to a deposition, 
and Zewadski cited the same deposition, nevertheless, 
Zewadski's testimony was not impeached nor any facts set forth 
contradicting Zewadski's sworn facts, or supporting Ford Credit's 
motion for summary judgment, because Ford Credit failed to file the 
deposition with the court. 
Evidence not properly before the court cannot be considered in 
23 
determining the merits of such a motion. In Thompson v. Ford Motor Co.. 384 
P.2d 109 ,14 Utah 2d 334 (1963), depositions were taken but never published, 
marked, or introduced into evidence nor read by the trial court Although both 
parties cited from the depositions in their briefs before the trial court, this 
Court said on appeal from summary judgment, "... we must 
assume that the testimony contained in the deposition was not 
presented to or considered by the lower court." Similar rulings 
were made in the cases of Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity and 
Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 380 P.2d 135 , 14 Utah 
2d 169 (1963), and Rosander v. Larsen. 376 P.2d 146, 14 Utah 
2d. 1 (1962). In Rosander. the Court said: 
"It deserves mentioning that the plaintiff's deposition 
was taken in this action. Defendant in his brief makes reference 
to this deposition. However, the deposition as received by this 
court was still in the sealed envelope of the reporter. Under the 
circumstances we cannot consider its contents and must assume 
that it was not considered by the lower court." 
Matters not admitted in evidence before trier of fact 
will not be considered on appeal. Pilcher v. State of Utah 
Department of Social Services. 663 P.2d 450 (Utah 1983); Utah 
Department of Transportation v. Fuller. 603 P.2d 814 (Utah 
1979); Corbet v. Corbet. 472 P.2d 430, 24 Utah 2d 378 (1970). 
In reviewing the record on appeal: 
Held: "In reviewing the record on appeal from a summary 
judgment, court treats the statements and evidentiary 
materials of the appellant as if a jury would receive 
them as the only credible evidence and the court 
sustains the judgment only if no issue of fact which 
could affect the outcome can be discerned." Blodgett 
v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978). 
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In brief summary, a motion for summary judgment can 
only be granted if supported by admissible evidence properly 
before the court. It cannot be granted if only supported by 
pleadings, inadmissible evidence or evidence not submitted to 
the court on a timely basis. 
The trial court's findings in its summary judgment 
order (TR-228-230) weighing the verity and creditability of 
Zewadski's sworn testimony, and finding that there was no 
genuine issue as to any material fact , is an error in law and is 
subject to review for correctness here. 
POINT 111. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON FORD CREDIT'S COUNTERCLAIM AS 
A MATTER OF LAW AND IN VIEW OF ZEWADSKI'S 
UNCONTRADICTED VERIFIED AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE'S OF ESTOPPEL AND FRAUD 
The trial courts granting of summary judgment in 
favor of Ford Credit's counterclaim (TR-573-575) was an error if 
based upon earlier findings contained in the interlocutory 
summary judgment filed January 2, 1991 (TR-228-230), in this 
instant case, which issues are argued hereinabove. 
The Summary Judgment granted in favor of Ford 
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Credit's counterclaim found, in part, that: 
"there is no remaining issue as to any material fact in 
this case, including but not limited to, such issues regarding 
service contracts or warranties", "that all events have occurred 
which entitle FMCC to recover a judgment from Plaintiff 
pursuant to the terms of the Lease", and "that FMCC is entitled 
to judgment on its Counterclaim against Plaintiff as a matter of 
law" (TR-573-575). 
The basis of the trial courts summary judgment on 
counterclaim was that the trial court had already earlier ruled 
upon the issues (TR-228-230, TR-500-501). 
The earlier interlocutory summary judgment on the 
complaint issued forth apparently first on the theory that all 
implied warranties were properly disclaimed by a clause in the 
contract and so no material facts were at issue because the 
problems Zewadski complained of were of the implied warranty 
nature (TR-228-230). 
This basis is more apparent when an earlier order is 
examined (TR-500-501). Zewadski sought by motion (TR-355-
366) with affidavit (TR-367-372), to vacate the first summary 
judgment ; and by motion (TR-376-376a, TR-383-392) with 
affidavit (TR-393-398), and verified proposed amended pleading 
(TR-377-382), to amend the complaint; and sought by motion 
(TR-283-292) with affidavits (TR-296-301, TR-268-279) and 
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verified proposed supplemental answer (TR-337-343) to amend 
the answer to Ford Credits counterclaim, and the trial court 
ruled, in an order filed August 30, 1991 (TR-500-501), that the 
issues sought to be introduced had already been presented 
previously and ruled upon in the earlier summary judgment order 
(TR-228-230). 
The trial court had ruled earlier that there were no 
implied warranties on the automobile (TR-229) due to a 
disclaimer clause in the contract and so apparently did not give 
much weight to the implied warranty type problems complained 
of by Zewadski, however the trial court did rule that the 
problems complained of were without creditability, and that the 
claimed misrepresentations had not been made (TR-229), which 
was an error when Ford Credit neither contradicted nor 
impeached Zewadski's sworn testimony with any evidence. 
Zewadski answered (TR-48-55) to Ford Credit's counterclaim (TR-
26-27) setting forth denials, and express affirmative defenses of fraud and 
estoppel (TR-48-55, TR-50,50a). Neither Ford Credit's counterclaim, nor its 
motion for summary judgment upon it, were supported by any sworn evidence 
to contradict Zewadski's affirmative defenses of fraud and estoppel, said 
defenses the particularity for which were set forth in Zewadski's earlier 
verified first amended complaint (TR-10-11) quoted above, and other verified 
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pleadings admitted into the record pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 15(b). 
Additional affirmative defenses of fraud, to those set forth in 
Zewadski's verified complaint (TR-10-11) were introduced without 
objection and tried by implied consent, amending Zewadski's 
pleadings by application of U.R.C.P. Rule 15(b), showing the 
lease contract was fraudulent; an executory contract, 
incorporating by express reference a service contract, which two 
instruments together serve as an integrated contract, that, when 
construed together, show fraud upon the face of the instruments 
by their failure to provide a valid service contract or warranty, 
which was part of the bargain, and for which money was paid. 
(TR-549-554b, TR-542-548, )(TR~337-343) (TR-296-300) (TR-
268-278) (TR-377-343). 
Here quoted is part of Zewadski's Affidavit opposing 
Ford Credit's motion for summary judgment on their 
counterclaim, filed September 9, 1991. (TR-549-554b): 
"10. The lease contract included, as a material part of 
the bargain, a service contract for the vehicle, which 
was included and integrated into the lease contract by 
its being expressly listed upon the face of the lease 
contract instrument, integrated by reference, stated in 
this language: 
"The Vehicle is covered by any extended warranty or 
service contract described in this Lease and the 
following, if checked:" 
12. The service contract delivered to me was invalid 
by its express terms, stating in the following language: 
"The Extended Service Plan Contract coverage is 
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designed to complement the manufacturer's warranty 
and cannot be substituted for it. 
and; 
"Other Services and Repairs Not Covered: 
Repairs covered by the manufacturer's New Vehicle 
Warranty." 
13. The Lease contract instrument omits and did not 
provide me any manufacturer's warranty, or 
manufacturer's new vehicle warranty. 
14. The lease contract contains an integration clause 
in paragraph 31, stating: 
"This lease sets forth all of the agreements of the 
lessor and the Lessee for the lease of the Vehicle. 
There is no other agreement." (TR-549-554b) 
Two other verified pleadings set forth facts 
admissible as evidence supporting Zewadski's case of fraud 
and/or unconscionability. The "Supplemental/ Amending 
Complaint of Guy Barco Zewadski", filed July 26, 1991 (TR-
377-382), and the 'Verified Proposed Supplemental Answer", 
filed July 22, 1991, (TR-337-343) were verified, and submitted 
pursuant to procedural rules, in support of Zewadski's motions 
to supplement his complaint, and his answer to Ford Credit's 
counterclaim. Though the court denied Zewadski's motions to 
supplement his pleadings, nevertheless, these two verified 
testaments are admissible as evidence in this case. They were 
not stricken from the record, nor objected to by the opposing 
parties, but rather, argument was had on the issues (TR-383-392, 
TR-325-327), the trial court finding that there had been 
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extensive oral argument, lasting 40 to 45 minutes, and that no 
new factual or legal arguments were offered beyond those which 
had been briefed previously and ruled upon (TR-500-501). 
Utah law allows issues to be tried by implied consent between 
the parties by the introduction of evidence without objection. 
U.R.C.P. Rule 15 (b), and so, the sworn material is properly 
introduced as evidence. The fact that these two proposed 
amended pleadings were verified (TR-377-382; TR-337-343), 
and found by the court not to raise anything not raised before 
(TR-499-501; TR-580-582), merely makes them, in effect, 
opposing affidavits for purpose to oppose a motion for summary 
judgment and doesn't prejudice the opposing part ies. 
Utah courts have held: 
"A plaintiff's verified pleading that meets the 
requirements for affidavits can be considered the 
equivalent of an affidavit for the purpose of defeating 
a motion for summary judgment. " Pentecost v. 
Harward. 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985). 
Utah law allows issues to be tried by implied consent 
between the parties. U.R.C.P.. Rule 15 (b): 
"(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When 
issues not ra i sed by the pleadings are tried by express or 
implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all 
respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such 
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them 
to conform to the evidence and to raise these issues may be 
made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgment ; 
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but failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial 
of these i ssues. .." U.R.C.P. 15(b). (emphasis added) 
Utah courts have held: 
"There must be either express or implied consent of 
parties for trial of issues not raised in pleadings; implied 
consent may be found where one party raises issue material 
to other parties case, or where evidence is introduced without 
objection." General Insurance Company of America v. 
Carnicero Dvnastv Corporation. 545 P.2d 502, 503 (Utah 
1976). (emphasis added) 
Zewadski 's additional affirmative defenses of fraud 
and estoppel, properly brought into issue as hereinbefore 
explained, by the "Verified Proposed Supplemental Answer", 
filed July 22, 1991 (TR-337-343), are here quoted from the 
record, in part: 
" 1 . I believe the lease contract at issue is not 
enforceable as it is void, voidable, properly rescinded 
by notice, rescindable, or unconscionable, due to 
fraudulent misrepresentation by the lessor. 
2. The lessor sold counter defendant a "service 
contract", for the leased vehicle at issue, represented 
as an "extended warranty", which expressly states it 
"... is designed to compliment the manufacturer's 
warranty and cannot be substituted for it." The 
"service contract" instrument was not delivered at the 
time of sale but mailed to counter defendant after 
complaint, counterclaim, and answer to counterclaim 
were filed. 
3. No manufacturer's warranty was provided to 
counter defendant in any way; such warranty was 
omitted on face of contract instrument, and subsequent 
"corrections" of the lease instrument by the lessor and 
the counterplaintiff still omitted the "manufacturer's 
warranty". 
4. The "service contract", incorporated in the lease 
agreement contract was sold to counterclaim defendant 
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for seven hundred and seventy five dollars ($775.00) 
(about $1200.00 including interest), and increased the 
monthly payments for the lease about twenty dollars 
($20.00) for the sixty (60) months of the lease. 
5.Counter defendant paid several months lease 
payments prior to electing to rescind the contract by 
written notice to all parties, and was not delinquent or 
in default under the contract when the vehicle was 
returned as offered in the notice rescinding the 
contract. 
6.Terms of the lease contract required counter 
defendant to maintain vehicle for the life of the 
lease, so the purchased "service contract" was a 
material element to the lessee in making the bargain. 
7.Counter defendant was induced into the bargain by 
the representation that the "service contract" would 
provide valid, effective, extended warranty coverage 
for the life of the lease." (TR-337-343) 
Considering the argument above, affirmative defenses 
of fraud and estoppel were set forth with sworn testimony by 
Zewadski, tried by the parties, and not contradicted or 
impeached by any sworn testimony. The defenses should be 
ruled as sufficient to defeat the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment on Ford Credit's counterclaim, (and summary judgment 
on Zewadski's complaint), in that issues of material fact are 
presented and in dispute, and that no basis for judgment is 
evident as a matter of law. Utah Courts have held: 
"In reviewing the record on appeal from a summary judgment, 
court treats the statements and evidentiary materials of the 
appellant as if a jury would receive them as the only credible 
evidence and the court sustains the judgment only if no issue of 
fact which could affect the outcome can be discerned." Blodgett 
v. Martsch. 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978). 
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The trial court 's finding that there was no genuine 
issue as to any material fact and that Ford Credit was entitled to 
summary judgment as a matter of law is an error in law and is 
subject to review for correctness here. 
POINT IV. 
THE CONTRACT AT ISSUE IS UNCONSCIONABLE 
UNDER THE "UTAH CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES 
ACT" SO AS TO ENTITLE ZEWADSKI TO RELIEF 
UNDER THE ACT 
The record shows mat the contract at issue is unconscionable both 
under common law and the U.C.S.P.A. and that both Rick Warner and Ford 
Credit have violated the Utah consumer protection laws set forth in the "Utah 
Consumer Sales Protection Act", fU.C.S .P .A." ) U.C.A. 13-11-1 
through 19. 
Zewadski acted timely in giving notice of rescission 
and returning automobile, upon discovery of misrepresentations 
(TR-348-353) (see this brief, statement of facts #5 ). 
Rick Warner and Ford Credit are both "suppliers" in 
this case, as defined in U.C.A. 13-11-3(6); (TR-9, 10, 17; TR-
23; TR-110, 111). 
U.C.A. 13-11-3(6): "Supplier" means a seller, lessor, assignor, 
offeror, broker, or other person who regularly solicits , engages 
in, or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not he deals 
directly with the consumer." 
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Under the "U.C.S.P.A." it is unlawful, 
unconscionable, and against public policy for a "Supplier" to 
engage in a deceptive practice or act, or an unconscionable act 
or practice, regarding a "consumer transaction", including 
representations regarding warranties, either before, during or 
after the transaction (U.C.A. 13-11-4(2)(2J), and 
unconscionabili ty is a proper subject for review by the appellate 
court in a summary judgment matter even if it is brought up for 
the first time on appeal, however, in this case it was at issue, 
(TR-191-193). Unconscionabili ty, under the U.C.S.P.A. is a 
question of law and can be found by the Appellate Court even if 
the issue hasn't been raised at all but simply appears to the 
court. U.C.A. 13-11-5(1)(2)(3): 
"Unconscionable act or practice by supplier. 
(1) An unconscionable act or practice by a supplier 
in connection with a consumer transaction violates this 
act whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction. 
(2) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a 
question of law for the court. If it is claimed or 
appears to the court that an act or practice may be 
unconscionable, the parties shall be given a 
reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its 
setting, purpose, and effect to aid the court in making 
its determination. 
(3) In determining whether an act or practice is 
unconscionable, the court shall consider circumstances 
which the supplier knew or had reason to know." 
Utah Code 13-11-5(1)(2)(3) (emphasis added) 
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The Appellate Court is free to interpret the contract at 
issut nstant case with no deference to the trial courts 
conclusions. This court has held: 
" Standard of Review. In reviewing a summary 
judgment, we analyze the facts and inferences in the 
light most favorable to the losing party. Atlas Corp. 
v. Clovis N a t i Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
Because summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law, we review the trial court 's conclusions of law for 
correctness. Id. If a trial court interprets a 
contract as a matter of law, that interpretation is 
not afforded any particular deference on appeal. _ 
Power Sys. & Controls. Inc. v. Keith's Elec. Constr. 
Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9 (Utah App. 1988).. ." 
Fashion Place INV. v. Salt Lake County, / / o i 
941 , 943 (Utah App. 1989). (emphasis added) 
The Appellate Court is free to interpret the contract 
must construe both the lease instrument and 
the service contract instrument together as I lie service contract 
was incorporated by express reference into the lease contract 
(see argument, poin his appellant 's brief), and this fact 
is not in dispute, having been sworn i dmitted, and appa> 
upon the face of the instruments. ( TR-405, TR-378-379, TR-
3.W, Ik I /„ IS, IK I/O I M). 
The Utah Supreme Court, in interpreting cont ' 
"Where two or more instruments are executed by same 
parties contemporaneously, or at different t imes in 
course of same transaction, and concern same subject 
matter, they will be read and construed together so far 
as determining respective rights and interests of the 
parties, even though they do not in terms refer to each 
other." 
Bullfrog Marina \UQ. y, Qjlfrert M- Lenta, 501 P.2d 
266, 28 Utah 2d 261 (1972). 
"In determining issue of completeness of integration in 
writing, evidence extrinsic to the writing itself is 
inadmissible, and parol evidence is admissible to show 
circumstances under which the agreement was made 
and purpose for which the instrument was executed." 
Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz. 501 P.2d 266, 28 
Utah 2d 261 (1972). 
Some further general authorities regarding interpretation of 
contracts are here cited: 
INTEGRATED AGREEMENTS: (1) An integrated agreement is a 
writing or writings constituting a final expression of one or 
more terms of an agreement." Restatement of the Law. Second. 
Contracts. Sec. 209. 
RULES IN AID OF INTERPRETATION: (2) A writing is 
interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are part of the same 
transaction are interpreted together." Restatement of the Law. 
Second. Contracts, Sec. 202. 
"INTERPRETATION OF INTEGRATED AGREEMENT: (1) The 
interpretation of an integrated agreement is to be directed to the 
meaning of the terms of the writing or writings in light of the 
circumstances, in accordance with the rules stated in this 
chapter." Restatement of the jawn Second Contracts, Sec. 212. 
A recent Utah case applying the U.C.S.P.A., and 
finding unconscionability, is here cited in length: 
"The tenant also asserts that the landlord's actions 
were unconscionable under section 13-11-5 of the UCSPA. 
Under the statute, unconscionability does not require proof of 
specific intent but can be found by considering circumstances 
which the supplier "knew or had reason to know". Utah Code 
Amu 13-11-5(3). 
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he determination of unconscionability is a question 
of law. Utah Code Ann. 13- 11-5(2). This court is therefore 
free to review the record and make its own conclusions as to this 
determination. See State ex rel. Div. Consumer Protection v. 
Rio Vista Oil. Ltd.. 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990); Henrettv 
v. Manti Citv Corp.. 791 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah 1990). 
In Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and 
Livestock Co.. 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985), we discussed the 
doctrine of unconscionabili ty at length. The discussion was 
based on standards articulated in the Uniform Commercial Code, 
see U.C.C. 2-302, comment 1, and on contract law in general. 
The principles there discussed are, for the most part, applicable 
here. 
In Resource Management, the court distinguished 
"substantive" and "procedural" unconscionabili ty. Procedural 
unconscionabili ty focuses on the manner in which the contr 
act was negotiated and the circumstances of the parties, 706 
P.2d at 1041, and can be characterized as the "absence of 
meaningful choice" and a gross inequality of bargaining power." 
Id. at 1042 (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.. 
350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Substantive 
unconscionabili ty examines the relative fairness of the 
obligation assumed ; it requires terms "so one-sided as to oppre 
ss or unfairly surprise an innocent party", Resource 
Management. 706 P.2d at 1041 (citing Bekins Bar V Ranch v. 
Huth. 664 P.2d 455, 462 (Utah 1983)); Bill Stremmel Motors. 
Inc. v. IDS Leasing Corp.. 89 Nev. 414. 514 P.2d 654. 657 ( 
1973), or "an overall imbalance in the obligations and rights 
imposed by the bargain." Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d 
at 462. 
Under contract law, unconscionability is determined as 
of the time the parties enter into the contract. See Resource 
Management. 706 P.2d 1043. In contrast, under the UCSPA, an 
unconscionable act or practice may occur "before, during or 
after" a consumer transaction. In this case, therefore, 
consideration can be given to the landlord's actions during the 
course of the tenancy, as well as to his act of renting the 
premises init ially. ' Wade v. JobeT 818 P.2d 1006, 1016, 1017 
(Utah 1991). 
C o m m o n law inn OIISI IIMI .ilnlil \ V < r r \\ 11 li ,i i c tnarkably 
similar overall effect, but which was decided without benefit of 
consumer protection laws like the U.C.S.P.A., from another 
State, is here cited; 
"According to the lease agreement, Irving disclaimed 
all warranties, express and implied, and assumed no 
responsibilities for the performance or maintenance of the 
equipment in issue. In the lease agreement, Irving did not 
assign to M & H it's rights as vendee of the equipment against 
the manufacturer- vendor for breach of warranty; thus, in the 
event the equipment is found to be defective, as it was in this 
case, the lease agreement leaves the lessee without recourse 
against either the lessor or the manufacturer for breach of 
warranty. It is our determination that such an inequitable result 
raises the issue of unconscionability of the lease agreement. 
Unconscionability arises from the inequity of compelling 
payment for equipment that cannot be used without the right to 
interpose a defense or set off on the part of the lessee. The 
lessee in this situation is left without recourse against either the 
lessor or the manufacturer for receiving defective machinery. 
Although we recognize that a lessor may disclaim all warranties 
in the leased goods, he may not leave the lessee with defective 
machinery and with no avenue for recourse against 
manufacturer. " Irving Leasing Corp. v. M & H Tire Co.. 475 
N.E. 2d 127 (Ohio 1984). 
Zewadski's case is similar to the Irving case above, in 
that when viewed from the contract writings the overall effect of 
the contract, when construed as an integrated contract including 
the lease instrument and the service contract instrument, was 
that Zewadski was left with an automobile for 5 years, that he 
was required to keep in good order, and to see that all repairs 
were made, and for which he was liable for a all mechanical 
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defects, all electrical malfunctions, all rusted body parts, etc., 
manufacturer's warranty was included, and for which the service 
contract, by its express terms, was ineffective due to the lack of the 
manufacture i'- warranty, and finally, l.w which all implied warranties were 
disclaimed, and denied to Zewadski by both Rick Warner, and Ford Credit, ni 
the lease agreement, Rick Warner did not assign to Zewadski it's rights as 
vendee of the vehicle against the manufacturer for breach of warranty; thus, in 
the event the equipment was found to be unusable or defective, the lease 
agreement leaves the lessee without recourse against either the lessor or the 
manufacturer for breach of warranty. 
u.^. . ice. 
"(1) A deceptive act or practice by a suppliei >.< 
connection with a consumer transaction violates this chapter 
whether it occurs before, during, or after the transaction. 
"(2) Without limiting the scope of Subsection (1), 
a supplier commits a deceptive act or practice if the supplier, 
with intent to deceive: 
"(2)(j) indicates that a consumer transaction 
involves or does not involve a warranty, a disclaimer of 
warranties, particular warranty terms, or other rights, remedies, 
or obligations if the indication is false. " Utah Code 13-11-
4(l)(2)(2j) 
Ford Credit's representation that the vehicle had no 
implied warranties (TR-135-138) was contrary to the 
" I n i \K •• I) 111 li i 11 <' i I ' D I n i' H I I I I | i i n l n . c i m l 
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an unconscionable act, in violation of the UCSPA, U.C. 13-11-
4, and U.C. 13-11-5 , in that Ford Credit "had reason to know" 
(U.C. 13-11-5(3) that the disclaimer of implied warranties in 
the lease contract was negated by the "U.C.S.P.A."; and Ford 
Credit 's deception violates both the U.C. 13-11-5(1), and U.C. 
13-11-4(1)" whether it occurs before, during, or after the 
transaction"; and that it was was so represented with intent to 
deceive, in violation of U.C.A. 13-11-4, is evident by the fact 
that the very contract which Ford Credit seeks relief under in 
this instant case shows upon its face that a "service contract" 
was incorporated as part of the bargain (TR-17, TR-170-173, 
TR-549-554b). 
This appellate court should rule that the lease contract 
at issue is unconscionable under common law, and, under the 
"U.C.S.P.A." rU.C.A. 13-11-5 (1)(2)(3), and so void and 
unenforceable. 
POINT V 
SUMMARY DISPOSITION BY THIS COURT IS 
AVAILABLE ON SOME ASPECTS OF THIS CASE 
INCLUDING THE ISSUE OF UNCONSCIONABILITY OF 
THE CONTRACT AND TRANSACTION. 
This Court has the power to rule summarily on certain aspects of 
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this case. Upon appeal of a summary judgment this Court is free to interpret 
contract. 
Unconscionability of a contract and/ or transaction is a question of 
law, and imdri hnlh common IIIM IIHI ihe 11 ( ' S V A llnsCourl is free to 
determine if the contract and/ or transaction at issue is unconscionable. 
This Court is free, in the instant case, based upon the record, 
pursuant to common law, and the U)(2)(3), to summarily rule 
that the contract and/ or transaction is unconscionable, if it should find ii 
because the claim of unconscionability, and the evidence, facts and issues 
regarding unconscionability have been tried by the parties (TR-191-193; TR-
170-173; TR-186-195; TR-268-279; TR-296-301; TR-367-372; TR-377-382; 
TR-549,554b; TR-542-548; TR-689a-690; TR-707-711; TR-325-326), and 
Ford Credit and/ or Rick Warner have had ample opportunity to present 
opposing evidence as lo ihe selling purpose, and elleel l| » U.C.A. M i l ,'>( ?) 
to aid the court in making a determination of the claimed unconscionability of 
the contract and/or transaction, and have chosen to present absolutely 
no evidence In run) i iidnl in nl I In i \ idem c nl 
unconscionability Zewadski has submitted. 
The court may logically conclude that Ford Credit and/ 
or Rick W 
unconscionability of the contract and/ or transaction because 
they accepted the facts as presented by Zewadski, that the 
unconscionabili ty of the contract and/ or transaction is visible 
upon the face of the written instruments of the contract. 
Interpretation of law: Regarding appeal of a 
summary judgment, this court is not bound to any interpretation 
of law given by the trial court. This Court has held: 
"Since a summary judgment is granted as a matter of 
law rather than fact, the Court of Appeals is free to reappraise 
the trial court 's legal conclusions. Barber v. Farmers Ins. 
Exch.. 751 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
"In as much as a challenge to summary judgment 
presents for review conclusions of law only , because , by 
definition, summary judgments do not resolve factual issues, 
the Supreme Court reviews those conclusions for correctness, 
without according deference to the court 's legal conclusions." 
Bonham v. Morgan. 788 P.2d 497 (Utah 1989). 
Interpretation of contracts: Regarding the 
interpretation of contracts, this court is not bound to any 
interpretation made by the trial court. Utah courts have found 
that in reviewing on appeal a summary judgment enforcing a 
contract the Supreme Court, and/ or Appellate Court of the State 
of Utah gives no particular deference to the interpretation of the 
contract given by the trial court, and is free to reappraise the 
trial courts legal conclusions for correctness, analyzing the facts 
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and inferences : i the light most favorable to the losing party. 
" Standard of Review. In reviewing a summary 
judgment, we analyze the facts and inferences in the light 
most favorable to the losing party. Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'l 
Bank, 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). Because summary 
judgment is granted as a matter of law, we review the trial 
court 's conclusions of law for correctness. Id. If a trial court 
interprets a contract as a matter of law, that interpretation is not 
afforded any particular deference on appeal. Power 
Sys. & Controls, Inc. v Keith's Elec. Constr. Co., 765 P.2d 5, 9 
(Utah App. 1988)..." 
Fashion Place INV. v. Salt Lake County. 776 P.2d 941 , 943 
(Utah App. 1989). 
Unconscionable: Considering the hnt |»oin^ argument, 
this Court is free as a matter of law to determine whether the 
c i in I met nn. I (ransaction at issue is unconscionable under both 
common law and the "Utah « UIIMHIK I vi le- ProU'riion Acl" 
(see Point IV. above). The Utah Supreme Court has held: 
a*blW 
"The determination of unconscionability is a question 
oi law. Utah Code Ann. 13- 11-5(2). This court is therefore 
free to review the record and make its own conclusions as to this 
determination. See State ex rel. Djv. Consumer Protection v. 
Rio Vista Oil. Ltd.. 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990); Henrettv 
v. Manti Citv Corp.. 791 P.2d 506, 510 (Utah 1990). 
This case, beinj.> ;i ihspiilr nl in i pus1 , contract, 
with an integration clause, and in which the record shows no in* 
the parties have claimed or suggested that the contract is 
ambiguous, is sul.jtvl !•• Ilw i I evidence rule. The contract 
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may only be construed from its writings. The trial court record, 
as shown hereinabove, uncontradictedly presents the contract 
into evidence as an integrated contract of two instruments, a 
lease contract instrument and a service contract instrument, 
incorporated by express reference. As this Court is free to 
interpret the contract at issue from its writings only, Ford 
Credit and/ or Rick Warner have not and in fact cannot hope to 
add anything to the issue, and there is no reason this court 
should delay in ruling whether the contract is unconscionable 
upon its face, and that the transaction was unconscionable. 
If this Court should determine that, as a matter of law, 
the contract and or transaction at issue was unconscionable, 
then Zewadski submits that the summary judgments against him 
should be vacated and Ford Credit's Counterclaim to enforce the 
contract dismissed. Such an action is not without precedent in 
Utah: The Supreme Court of Utah has held: 
"Where ... it appears on appeal that the vendor, under 
the law as applied to contracts and the admitted facts , is 
entitled to recover any damages, the case will not be remanded 
for new trial, but the trial court will be directed to enter 
judgment dismissing the action.... Ordinarily in law cases we 
merely reverse the judgment, and remand the case for a new 
trial. However, where it is apparent , as in this case , that no 
view that can be taken of the law can the respondent recover on 
the contract in question , it would be useless to remand the case 
for a new trial....When it is clear from the record that a plaintiff 
cannot recover under any possible state of the evidence, a new 
trial should not be allowed merely to permit the parties to 
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satisfy a litigious spirit . But , under our practice , the 
plaintiff's in this case may, in any event , within a specified 
time, as a matter of right, institute another action, if they shoul 
d be so inclined. In no event , therefore should they be permitted 
to prosecute this action further." Dopp et al. v. Richards. 135 
P. 98, 43 Utah 332 (Utah S. Ct. 1913) 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment against 
Zewadski's complaint, and summary judgment in favor of Ford Credit's 
counterclaim, upon basis that all implied warranties were excluded on the 
automobile due to a disclaimer clause in the contract, and in weighing the 
credibility and verity of Zewadski's uncontradicted testimony. It was an error 
in law for the trial court to rule that the implied warranties were 
properly disclaimed by a clause in the contract when Federal law 
makes such disclaimers void if there is, as in this case, a service 
contract. It was an error in law, in a summary judgment 
proceeding, for the trial court to weigh the credibility and 
verity of Zewadski's uncontradicted, and unimpeached 
testimony. The record shows Zewadski has supported his 
complaint of fraud, deceit, and rescission of contract against 
Ford Credit and Rick Warner with admissible testimony and that 
neither Ford Credit nor Rick Warner contradicted Zewadski's 
testimony with any evidentiary material. 
In defense to Ford Credit's counter suit Zewadski set 
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forth affirmative defenses of estoppel and fraud, the 
particularity of which were set forth in the verified complaint, 
timely first amended complaint, affidavits with exhibits, and 
lastly, by verified pleadings admitted into evidence and tried by 
the parties as argued above. 
In Ford Credit's motions for summary judgments, both 
on Zewadski's complaint and on Ford Credit's counterclaim, no 
affidavits were used to support any contention that Zewadski's 
claims were false and that there were no genuine issues of 
material fact justifying summary judgment. Zewadski contends 
there are such issues, supported by affidavits and verified 
pleadings, and that his affirmative defenses of fraud and 
estoppel are well supported by evidence in the record. 
In spite of the fact that Rick Warner and Ford Credit 
had ample opportunity to do so, they have chosen to present no evidence 
contradicting any of the above. No evidence was ever given or presented to the 
Tryor of Fact to indicate that the representations made by Zewadski were, in 
fact, false. 
Though Ford Credit cited the deposition they took of Zewadski in 
their pleadings and memorandums for summary judgments, Ford Credit chose 
not to file the deposition with the trial court. 
The only logical conclusion from the above is that Ford Credit and 
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Rick Warner did not challenge the various claims made by Zewadski 
concerning fraudulent misrepresentations made by Rick Warner's agents 
because they accepted the fact that the misrepresentations had in fact been 
made. Therefore Ford Credit proceeded to contend that Zewadski was 
precluded from pursuing his claims as a matter of law because what Zewadski 
complained of were implied warranty issues and the contract at issue excluded 
all implied warranties with a disclaimer clause. 
This legal strategy by Ford Credit is deceptive and unconscionable, 
in that they should have known such disclaimers are without legal effect in 
cases like this and that the automobile had implied warranties regardless of any 
disclaimer clause. The record shows that Zewadski brought the Federal 
law regarding implied warranties [15 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2301 et. seq. 
] to Ford Credit's attention, and that their attorney's studied the 
matter (including it in their attorney's fee affidavit) and did not 
amend their position. Under the U.C.S.P.A., once they did 
know that the disclaimer clause in the contract was without 
effect, it was a deceptive and unconscionable act or practice for 
them to continue their case against Zewadski on that basis, 
because the U.C.S.P.A. applies to acts and practices committed 
before, during, and after a consumer transaction. 
The record shows Zewadski gave timely notice of 
rescission of the contract to both Ford Credit, and Rick Warner, 
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and returned the vehicle in good condition as directed. 
This case is based upon an express integrated contract 
consisting of the lease instrument and a service contract listed 
upon the lease instrument and incorporated by reference, both in 
the record. The complaint, and the affirmative defenses the 
record shows Zewadski set forth of fraud and estoppel, simply 
rely upon the writings of the integrated contract. This Court is 
free to interpret the contract with no deference to the trial courts 
interpretation. This Court is free to find unconscionability of a 
contract or transaction as a matter of law. Rescission of a 
contract is a remedy available in this case. 
Zewadski respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the lower court's summary judgment on Ford Credit's 
counterclaim, and dismiss it, or that failing, said judgment 
should be reversed and dismissed, or reversed and remanded for 
trial or further action by the trial court. 
Zewadski respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the lower court's summary judgment dismissing Zewadski's first 
amended complaint, and remand the matter for trial or further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 1st day of July, 1992. fo r> 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICK WARNER LINCOLN-MERCURY 
and FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER 
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, 
Counterplaintiff, 
v. 
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI, 
Counterdefendant. 
Civil No. 89-0901423CN 
Judge Pat B. Brian 
Defendant, Ford Motor Credit Company's ("FMCC"), Motion for 
Summary Judgment on its Counterclaim came on for hearing, 
pursuant to Notice, before the above-entitled Court, the 
Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, on September 20, 1991, at 
00573 
9:30 a.m., and FMCC being represented by Thomas F. Taylor, and 
Plaintiff being present and appearing on his own behalf, and the 
Court having reviewed the files and records herein, including the 
Motion, Affidavits and extensive Memoranda of the parties in 
support of and in opposition to the Motion, and having heard the 
argument of the parties, and it appearing from the record (1) 
that any and all other pending motions, objections and other 
pleadings had been reviewed and heard by the Court, (2) that 
there is no remaining issue as to any material fact in this case, 
including but not limited to, such issues regarding service 
contracts or warranties, (3) that all events have occurred which 
entitle FMCC to recover a judgment from Plaintiff pursuant to the 
terms of the Lease, which is the subject of this case, (4) that 
the Lease, which is the subject of this lawsuit, is a true lease, 
and (5) that FMCC is entitled to judgment on its Counterclaim 
against Plaintiff as a matter of law, and the Court being fully 
advised in the premises, and good cause appearing therefore, it 
is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That Plaintiff's Objection to Form of the Order 
prepared by FMCC dated / ~ ^ O — ' 1"!/ is hereby 
denied. 
2. FMCC's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. 
-2-
..nrw r. 
3. FMCC is hereby granted judgment in the amount of 
$5,692.44 plus interest at the rate of 10% per annum from and 
after August 28, 1989 to the date hereof. 
4. FMCC is awarded attorneys' fees in the amount of 
$9,267.50 for all litigation expenses in these proceedings. 
5. FMCC is awarded costs of suit, and post-judgment 
interest on the whole award at the rate of 10% per annum. 
APPROVED this $ O day of September, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
¥ * 




Third Judic??.! Ufsirtci 
JAN 0 2 1991 
SAC LAK f^cOUNTY 
KIM R. WILSON (j 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Ford Motor Credit Company 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
VS. SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
RICK WARNER LINCOLN-MERCURY 
and FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
FORD MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY, Civil No. 89-0901423CN 
Counterplaintiff, Judge Pat B. Brian 
vs. 
GUY BARCO ZEWADSKI, 
Counterdefendant. 
Defendant Ford Motor Credit Company's Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the First Amended Complaint came on for hearing, 
pursuant to notice, before the above entitled Court, the 
Honorable Pat B. Brian presiding, on December 14, 1990, at 8:30 
a.m. and Ford Motor Credit Company being represented by Kim R. 
m>22 
Wilson, and plaintiff being present and appearing on his own 
behalf, and the Court having reviewed the files and records 
herein, including the motion, affidavits and extensive memoranda 
of the parties in support and opposition to the motion, and 
having heard argument of the parties, and it appearing from the 
record (1) that statements of Rick Warner Lincoln-Mercury or its 
employees were not false, fraudulent nor material 
misrepresentations or omissions relating to capabilities of the 
vehicle; (2) that all warranties, if any, as to merchantability 
or fitness for purpose were excluded; (3) that there is no 
credible showing that the vehicle failed to perform within 
acceptable standards; (4) that there was no misrepresentation or 
omission regarding income tax issues; (5) that there was no 
alteration of the lease contract; (6) that there is no genuine 
issue as to any material fact; (7) and that Ford Motor Credit 
Company is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and the Court 
being fully advised in the premises, and good cause appearing 
therefore, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Ford Motor Credit Companyfs Motion for Summary Judgment 
be, and the same hereby is, granted. 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint for Recision of Contract, Recovery 
of Damages, Deceit, Fraud, and Plaintiff's First Amended 
Complaint For Recision of Contract, Recovery of Damages, Deceit, 
-2-
00.229 
Fraud, be, and the same hereby are, dismissed with prejudice and 
on the merits. 
3. Costs and attorney's fees are awarded to Ford Motor 
Credit Company in an amount to be determined in further 
proceedings. 
4. Ford Motor Credit Company's Counterclaim against 
plaintiff be, and the same hereby is, unaffected by this order 
and remains pending.
 / y/ 
DATED this '^L~ day of^ Dejjfimbep, 19J9<^. 
i 
BY THE COURT: 
S 
Pat B. Brian 
District Court Judge 
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Leeae payment* (itnm 4 on tha revetae aide) Thai payment 
ah«n noi permit tha Leaaoe to kaap tha Vehicle Tha Laaaa* 
atao ahaH pay to Ihn Leader any damage which tha Laaaor may 
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wHhtn tO day* * *d •• nfa awn • • p a n * * from an (ndapandani third 
p*rty apraaapia to th* L***or and Ford Cr*dtt « prolaaa<o«Ml 
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amount r e * * * * * by f «r« O r * * * ap*h the aaka ot t h * x*Mc»* at 
wneiaaate ' 
( I t ) T*rm4n*tk»n — LM* tnaorarte*' Th* L**a*a *«r*aa that apon 
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appfkad fo fh* pereheee priee 
013) L*a* or Oeatruetlon ol V*h«el* N th* V*hlel* la loot or da 
etroyed and the Laaaa* la not m deiauii under Ihi* Laaaa lha 
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anca proeeeda reoefved by ford CredH lor tha Vehtete 
(t*, Oof tuft If rh« Lasae* faPa to make any payment und*' (hi* 
Leaaa when it I* due or u the Le* *e * laHt to knap anr other 
aorn»n>ani m thia Laaaa th* L***or may terminate th*< Laaaa 
and lake back tha Vehicle Tha Laaaor may go on lha LMaee a 
Prop any to rataka ma Venfc'e Era* " fha *at»ot r»fa*«t tha 
Vehicle tha Laaaaa matt atm pay at once th* turn ot (a) the 
dttlnrence H any between lha Adluaiad Balance Sublect to 
Lenaa Cha pa* Uee Item ?t above) a no net amount received 
by ford Credit uoon lha tale ol the Vehicle at wholesale and 
(b> »H othar amount* )h«>n due yndar |h»» { » « ( t Tha L*»**» 
muai alio pay aH aipenaaa paid by lha Laaaor to enforce the 
Laaaor a right* under thia Laaaa including maeonabie attor 
nay a teee aa permuted by law and any damage* cau*ed to 
fh* Laaaor becauaa ot the Leeaee a deiauit Tha Leaabr may 
aell iha Vahteia al pub«c or prtvat* * •>* with or without nolle* 
>e th* Laaaaa 
( * • ) Taa* t Tha Le»«*a wttt pay alt aalaa uaa and other ta«aa and 
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tntm ol thia Lea* * The l * * * * e wtn alto pay an ta>ea thai * • • 
Charged to tha Laaaor by reaaon ol the L*aeor a talereet In the 
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(17) V*Mcl* Uaa Th* Laaaaa w * obey •» *ewa in uaing the VeM 
eta The Leeaee wtit not *ae or permit the aa* ol the Vehicle (I) 
outaMe tha ei*t« where the Vehicle waa Hrii tHtad and or rap 
latared lor mora than 3 0 daya without tha Laaaor a and ford 
Cradlt a prior wrlltan conaent (It) oetmrte ol lha United 9tn»aa 
except in Canada or Mexico K auch uaa doea not a«eaed 3 0 
daya or (IH) aa a public or private carrier Tha Laaaa* ehatt not 
place any etpn or mar* on th* Vehicle uniaa* the La**or 
apree* io it ft tha Laaaor apreaa the Leeaee win pey Ih* coat 
to r*mov* th* **pn or merk, end a l neaded tepett* that ara 
( i t ) HidamnHy Th* Laaaee wet M*wwffy the Laaaor and Ford 
Credit from any Iota or damaaa to the VeMeia or Ha content! 
during tha term ol thta Leaae Th* Leaaen win alto indemnity 
the Laaaor and ford Credit from eft claima loaaea and coal* 
anting out of the uaa or condition of tha Vehicle The Leatee 
wtH pay a« Ime* tthooaad on th* vehtete or on «*y qrwa' ot the 
Vehicle dwrinp the tarm or ihi* Laaaa It ih* Laaaaa 'alia lo pay 
the ftnee and the Leaaor part tha Laaaaa «m pny tha Laaaor 
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{**) • * c « m y Depoefl Any ••ewfty d*po*H h««d by th* L***or 
«nd*r thta Laaaa may ba e**d to pey *K eo*t* that th* Leeaee 
(30) WMowdm—Mn* Reeenro* Any reconditioning raaerva held by 
th* ^aaaot *nd*r thia Leaae may be treed to pey the coat ol 
reconditioning the Vehicle that th* L * * * « * ahouM pay under 
tfw* L***a pel dooe not 
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fo thia Laaaa '* "•« law of fha a(*f« who*a (ha Laaaor • place 
Of buatnoee ta • * aei forth on lim front »| thi| Laaaa " that 
•aw dooa not *How any o' the epreemanta in thia Lee*e tha 
onea that *r* not **ow*d wtP b* voM. Th* taat pf Ihi* L***« 
OOARAMTt 
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HOflC* • » OTHER SIDf FO* IMPORTANT INFORMATION 
Extended service nan/contract provisions " ^ 
This »s an ESP TOTAL Service contract (with options listed in Note-1 below) between 
G ZEWADSKI and RICK WARNER LINCOLN-M and is insured by The^American Road Insurance 
Company. Under this contract the dealership agrees to repair or replace any covereo 
parts that are defective in materials or workmanship. You will be charged the 
deductible amount stated below for all repairs or replacements initiated during the 
Contract Period. If applicable, covered parts include Maintenance and Wear items. 
1. CONTRACT PERIOD. This contract provides coverage up to the earlier of 100000 
miles* or 60 months from the original in-service date, whichever occurs first. 
2. WHERE TO 60 FIR REPAIRS, It is recommended but not required that you return tc 
your selling dealership for repair of a covered component (Just present your 
membership care). As the seller of the contract, your dealership is interested 
in your satisfaction. If your vehicle is a long distance from that dealership, 
contact the nearest participating Ford or Lincoln-Mercury dealership in the 
United States or Canada. 
3. COVERED COMPONENTS. Components, including Maintenance and Wear items (if 
specified in Note-1 below), covered by this contract are described on the reverse 
side. During the Contract Period, the dealership agrees to repair or replace any 
covered components that are found to be defective in materials or workmanship. 
For each eligible repair visit, you will be charged a deductible of $ 25 by the 




REPAIRS. Repairs will be made with service or remanufactured parts authorized by 
Ford Motor Company. 
CARE OF VEHICLE. Your vehicle must be properly operated and maintained in 
accordance with the maintenance schedule in the Owner's Manual. 
REFUND. UPON WRITTEN REQUEST TO THE SELLING DEALER wi 
the dealership will terminate the contract and refu 
Requests received after 15 days will be refunded on a 
Rate Method). It is required that the applicat 
provision, an odometer reading or statement, and mem 
with your request. If the membership card is unavaila 
that effect must be submitted. Refunds will be 
lienholder by the dealership. If the Maintenance an 
with your contract, or added at a later date, it is 
contract. The contract and option cannot be can 
other. If this contract is transferred, it is not-eli 
thin 15 days from purchase, 
nd the full purchase price, 
partial refund basis (Short 
ion for contract, contract 
bership card(s) be returned 
ble, a written statement to 
made to the purchaser or 
d Wear Option was purchased 
considered part of the ESP 
celled separately from each 
gible for a refund. 
7. TRANSPORTATION REIMBURSEMENT. If your covered vehicle becomes inoperable and 
must be kept out of use overnight to make a repair under this contract, the 
dealership will reimburse the base rental charges (excluding taxes, insurance, 
and mileage) for a substitute vehicle, not to exceed $25for any one day ($30 a 
day for luxury cars), for a maximum of five days while the repair is being 
completed. The replacement vehicle must be rented from a Ford or Lincoln-Mercury 
dealership or other commercial agency to be eligible for reimbursement. 
8. TOWING REIMBURSEMENT. If a covered part fails and makes towing necessary, towing 
costs, not payable by insurance, will be covered for up to £45 to the repairing 
Dealershi p. 
The dealership is insured to the extent of its obligations under this Extended 
Service Plan Contract oy a policy of insurance issued to it, by The American Road 
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Covered Components 
All vehicle components are covered against defects in material and 
workmanship under the Ford Total Plans except for the items listed 
below as "Components Hot Covered". 
The Maintenance and Wear Option provides the following additional 
services: 
• Maintenance - scheduled maintenance sen/ices as listed in the Owner Guide 
applicable to the vehicle. 
• Wear Items - Brake pads and linings, clutch lining, spark plugs, engine drive 
belts and hoses, wiper blades and shock absorbers. 
Components NOT Covered 
• Battery and cables, belts and hoses , brakes (front 
hub, drums, shoes, lining, disc rotors and pads), 
coolant, exhaust system, filters, fluids, l ights (bulbs, 
sealed beam and lenses), lubricants, manual clutch 
assembly, shock absorbers, spark plugs and wires, 
squeaks and rattles, tires, tune-up, wheel balance 
and alignment, wiper blades. 
• Exterior - Adjustments (glass and body parts), bright 
metal (outside ornamenta t ion) , b u m p e r s , g lass , 
mo ld ings , pa int , rus t , shee t me ta l , side-view 
mirror(s), water leaks, wheel covers and ornaments , 
wind noise. 
• Interior - carpets, rearview mirror, trim, upholstery. 
Other Services and Repairs NOT Covered 
• Repairs covered by the Manufacturer's Mew Vehicle 
Warranty. 
• Repairs due to recalls by the manufacturer or repairs 
caused by damage or unreasonable use (damage from 
road hazards, accident, fire or other casualty, misuse, 
negligence, racing or failures caused by modifica-
tions or parts not authorized or supplied by Ford). 
• Repairs resulting from lack of required maintenance 
(failures caused by the owner neglecting to perform 
the required maintenance services set forth in the 
Owner's Guide for the vehicle). Costs of these routine 
maintenance services are not covered. 
• Damage from the environment (airborne fallout, 
chemicals, tree sap, salt, hail, windstorm, lightning, 
road hazards, etc.). 
• Maintenance service and wear item replacements are 
not covered during the period covered by this contract 
un le s s t he Maintenance and Wear Option was 
purchased. Services covered under the Maintenance 
and Wear Option are shown above. 
• Repairs needed to a covered part caused by the failure 
of a non-covered part. 
• Repairs to the vehicle if the odometer is altered, 
broken or r e p a i r e d / r e p l a c e d so t ha t the actual 
mileage cannot be determined. 
• To the extent allowed by law, loss of use of vehicle 
inc luding loss of t ime , inconvenience, com-
mercial loss or consequential damages. 
• Repairs to the vehicle performed outside the 50 States 
and Canada and repairs required because of use 
outside the 50 States and Canada. 
• Repairs made on or before the enrollment date of this 
contract are not eligible for reimbursement. 
• The Extended Service Plan Contract coverage is de-
signed to complement the manufacturers warranty 
and cannot be substi tuted for it. failure to transfer 
the manufacturer's warranty will result in second 
owner responsibility for payment of the cost of repairs 
that the transfer of the warranty would have covered. 
Transferability 
1 9 8 9 mode l s - This coverage is eligible for transfer 
provided it has not been cancelled. 
1 9 8 8 and 1B87 m o d e l s - This coverage may be 
eligible for transfer provided it has not been cancelled 
and any remaining first owner's powertrain and major 
component coverage warranty is transferred *. 
1 9 3 6 a n d p r io r m o d e l vehic les - This coverage is 
eligible for transfer provided it has not been cancelled. 
l o t ransfer the remaining, coverage, send the 
inembciship card, pics^nt nv 'eage, the new owner's 
nctrr.e and address, and a check for the appropriate 
TPS 11 =>31 A tb\ Total 2 * 
amount** to the address shown below. Transferred 
contracts are not eligible for cancellation. 
Extended Service Plan Headquarters 
P.O. Box 1 9 0 9 
Dearborn, Michigan 4 8 1 2 1 
•See your local ford or Lincoln-Mercury dealer for availability of 
warranty transfer and warranty transfer requirements 
• • Contract Dated Prior to 1 / 1 / 87 - $25 transfer fee 
Contract Dated 1/1/87 or Later - $30 transfer (ec (or $130 if 
$100 transfer fee required for the powertrain warrantv transfer) 
Note: Repossessed vehicles are not eligible for tranc fer. 
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